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Now that some of  
the worst effects of the 
financial crisis are fading, 
our attention has properly 
turned to the future. The 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 
contains Congress’s blueprint for addressing gaps in the finan-
cial market regulatory and supervisory framework, the types 
of gaps that contributed to the tumultuous events of 2007 and 
2008. Among other key provisions, the new law calls for greater 
oversight of the shadow banking system, stricter supervision of 
systemically important financial institutions, and a resolution 
authority to deal with too-big-to-fail financial firms.
Those provisions cover a lot of territory. In this issue of  
Forefront, we explain some of the ways that the details will get 
worked out. Congress has asked the Federal Reserve and other 
regulatory agencies to write hundreds of new rules as part of 
Dodd–Frank’s implementation. The law requires many of these 
rules to be final as soon as this summer.
Of course, Dodd–Frank did not cover everything. As the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s James Thomson argues 
in this issue, the creation of a federally chartered “bad bank” to 
acquire and dispose of distressed assets is another idea whose 
merits should be considered. The Bank’s Emre Ergungor and 
Thomas Fitzpatrick make the case for states to evaluate some 
options that would make it harder for irresponsible investors  
to neglect their properties.
This issue also includes an update on the Bank’s model for 
detecting systemic risk in the financial system —a model we 
hope can be a useful tool for newly created entities such as the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council. Finally, we interview 
banking scholar Charles Calomiris, who comments on elements 
specific to Dodd–Frank as well as additional ideas he considers 
important to regulatory reform.
As always, we’d like your comments on these efforts, just as we 
encourage all points of view about the implementation of the 
new legislation.
In the past, I’ve likened the rule-making phase to the finishing  
of a house. With skillful craftsmanship, we can carry out this 
complicated and challenging responsibility in a way that makes 
our financial house solid and secure. An open, continuous  
dialogue that considers many perspectives is most likely to 
achieve the goal of financial stability.
I invite you to get involved. An enormous amount of information 
on the proposals is already available through dedicated websites 
from the Federal Reserve and other financial system regulators.  
It’s easy to comment. Go to the Federal Reserve Board’s  
Freedom of Information Office at www.federalreserve.gov or 
visit www.regulations.gov to read the proposed rules and then 
have your say. 
Working together, we can build a stronger and more stable 
financial system. So speak up—we are listening.  ■
Sandra Pianalto 
President and Chief Executive Officer 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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Stop Investing in Stadiums… Start Investing in Kids 
Forefront Fall 2010
Success By 6®, a strategic initiative of United Way of Greater 
Cincinnati, is working to improve outcomes for young children  
in support of the organization’s number one priority—
“Children are prepared for kindergarten.” Our work is  
focused on improving the early childhood system by 
increasing access to high-quality early childhood education 
and best practice home visitation. The combination of these 
services, when targeted to reach at-risk children, prenatal 
through age 5, has proven to be effective in improving 
health outcomes and kindergarten readiness. 
The current system too often falls short in meeting the needs  
of young children, in part due to misaligned goals among 
child-serving programs, insufficient funding of services, and  
inconsistent quality standards. In 2007, United Way estab-
lished the Winning Beginnings campaign for early childhood  
to provide local, private resources to improve the system 
and increase access to quality services.  
The scholarship model being piloted in Minnesota is a 
promising way of getting children into quality programs 
using demand-side incentives. Our strategies focus on both 
supply and demand. On the demand side we aim specifically  
at getting children enrolled in programs that work, including 
Every Child Succeeds home visitation and the Cincinnati 
Public School Summer Bridge program, among others. 
On the supply side, working with 4C for Children, the local 
resource and referral agency, we help child care programs 
achieve and maintain quality standards through leadership 
development and coaching. We have established Learning 
Circles for quality-rated programs to understand how to use 
data to drive decisions and improve practice. 
The work we are doing in the Greater Cincinnati community 
is an important part of the cradle-to-career education con-
tinuum, a philosophy that has been adopted by members of  
the local business, academic, and philanthropic communities.  
When state and federal policymakers incorporate early 
childhood education — prenatal through age 5 — into the 
education continuum, with funding, aligned standards, 
and consistent access, we will see improved outcomes for 
children and communities across the country.
Stephanie Wright Byrd, MHA 
Executive Director 




 2 Winter 2011For those of us who have been working in the field of  
early childhood for years, the recent economic research  
of Art Rolnick, James Heckman, and others, demonstrating 
the high return on investment of early childhood programs, 
has literally changed the conversation we can have with both  
public- and private-sector leaders. We are now able to say 
investing in early childhood is not only the “right” thing to 
do—it’s the smart thing to do.  We are indebted to econo-
mists for giving us this new perspective on our work and a 
new way of describing its impact.  
In “Stop Investing in Stadiums… Start Investing in Kids,” 
Rolnick describes the Minnesota Early Learning Foundation  
and its new flagship program, Scholarship Plus. Rolnick 
outlines four key aspects of the work in Minnesota: Start 
early (prenatally), be able to go to scale, measure results, 
and engage parents. I am proud to say that in Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, we have a 10-year old, nationally recognized, 
comprehensive early childhood system named Invest in 
Children built on those same tenets. Invest in Children is a 
public/private partnership staffed by the Cuyahoga County 
Office of Early Childhood, and we have the evaluation data 
to show that we are making a difference. Our independent 
evaluation is conducted by the Center for Urban Poverty 
and Community Development in the Mandel School of  
Applied Social Sciences at Case Western Reserve University.    
The continuum of services we offer begins during the  
prenatal period and continues until the child reaches kinder-
garten. The continuum includes home visiting programs, 
health and behavioral health programs, and a number of 
child care initiatives to raise the quality of care across all 
settings for children 0 to 6 years. We are in the fourth year 
of our Universal Pre-Kindergarten Program, which provides  
While I don’t disagree with the proposal of using CRA money  
to fight vacancy and abandonment, this situation would not  
have occurred had the banks not created it through fore-
closure in the first place. Though this proposal would assist 
with rebuilding neighborhoods, it would be of greater assis-
tance not to allow this situation to occur in the first place. 
One of the biggest issues nationwide is  banks’ reluctance 
to write off principal and allow moderate-income families 
to stay in their homes. Then, adding insult to injury, these 
homes remain vacant, until the bank writes off the loan, 
Using the CRA to Fight Vacancy and Abandonment 
Forefront Spring 2010
then sells the property at auction for less money than the 
original homeowner (who now is unable to obtain another 
mortgage due to foreclosure and bad credit) could have paid.
In addition to these measures, CRA funds should be used to  
allow those who have suffered foreclosure to receive alternate  
mortgage loans with no time frame penalties, and also be 
used to write down principal. It has never made sense to me  
to foreclose on someone and then sell their house for a price  
that the original owners could have paid.
Jody Veler 
Egg Harbor City, New Jersey
high-quality care to 1,000 preschoolers across the county  
and makes it accessible to low- and moderate-income 
families via parent scholarships. Many of our families access 
multiple programs, according to their needs and the age 
of the child, and over 160,000 children have been served in the 
past decade.
Here are some of our evaluation results:  
  ■  Medical concerns were addressed at 39 percent of  
the nurse home visits to mothers and their newborns, 
potentially avoiding more costly forms of medical care.  
  ■   Eighty-six percent of low-income families in our Medical 
Home Pilot Program brought their child to all of their well  
child visits during the first year of life as compared to a 
rate of 40 percent in the general Medicaid population.
  ■   Children in our Universal Pre-Kindergarten Program 
entering the Cleveland Metropolitan School District  
scored three points higher on the Kindergarten Readiness 
Assessment for Literacy than average for the district.  
In addition, children who had scored the lowest on  
cognitive measures upon entrance to the program 
showed the most significant gains at exit.
We are all aware that tough choices lie ahead on state and 
local budgets. It is our hope that at a time when funds are 
tight, policymakers will use limited dollars where they can 
have the greatest impact. We encourage private funders to 
do the same.  In the words of Rolnick, “I think it’s important 
for communities to get their priorities in order to make it 
clear that this is an area we can’t afford not to invest in.”
Rebekah L. Dorman, PhD 
Director 




    3 refront FThe debate centers on two main 
arguments. One is that UI increases 
the nation’s unemployment rate  
and lengthens unemployment spells  
because job seekers put less effort 
into the search, a form of what 
economists term “moral hazard.” 
The other is that UI is not a signifi-
cant factor in unemployment  
duration or rate, and something  
else is mainly responsible for the 
high numbers of both. 
A New Deal
Signed into law by President Franklin 
Roosevelt in 1935 in response to the  
Great Depression, the Social Security  
Act provided the original framework 
of the unemployment insurance 
system. UI provides benefits for 
eligible workers who have lost their 
jobs involuntarily. Regular benefits 
are based on a percentage of an 
individual’s earnings over a recent 
52-week period and are paid for 
a maximum of 26 weeks in most 
states. 
Unemployment Benefits:  
A Disincentive to Job Seeking?
Harvard economist Robert Barro  
is one of the highest-profile critics  
of unemployment benefits. In a 
recent Wall Street Journal op-ed,  
he argued that in trying economic 
times, it is reasonable to adopt a  
more generous UI program—but 
not one that lasts almost two years. 
Unemployment benefits decrease 
efficiency, Barro and others argue, 
because the program subsidizes 
unemployment and can cause 
insufficient job search, job accep-
tance, and levels of employment. 
An unemployed person drawing 
benefits, for example, might search 
less vigorously for a job or be more 
selective about accepting offers 
than he would be in the absence  
of benefits.
Unemployment Benefits:  
An Economic Booster?
Some people may indeed take  
longer to find a new job because of 
unemploy ment insurance extensions,  
but many economists think that UI 
is not a large contributing factor in 
driving up the rate of unemployment  
or in lengthening its average duration. 
Almost 15 million Americans  
were jobless as of the end of 2010,  
a strikingly high 9.4 percent of  
the would-be working population. 
Although the mass layoffs that 
marked the beginning of the  
recession have tapered off, people 
who are out of work are having a 
hard time finding new jobs. A full 
6.2 million of the unemployed have 
been that way for at least half a 
year. On average today, the unem-
ployed stay out of work for a record-
high 34 weeks, about 50 percent 
longer than in previous cycles. 
As a consequence, more unem-
ployed Americans than ever are 
tapping federal unemployment  
insurance (UI) benefits after  
exhausting state benefits. This  
situation has reignited a policy  
debate: Are overly generous ben-
efits at least partly responsible for 
the rising unemployment rate?
nt Upfr
Unemployment Benefits: Help or Hindrance? 
Amy Koehnen,  
Associate Editor
2008 2009
Timeline of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program (EUC08)
November 21, 2008  Maximum extension of benefits increased to  
20 weeks; Tier II benefits introduced, providing up to an additional  
13 weeks of benefits for those who worked in states with a total  
unemployment rate of at least 6 percent.
February 17, 2009  Expiration date extended to December 26, 2009; 
everyone receiving benefits under EUC08 to receive an additional  
$25 weekly benefit.
June 30, 2008  EUC08 program is introduced, with a 13-week  
maxi mum extension of benefits; set to expire March 28, 2009  
(last day to file). 
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Bank of San Francisco compared 
the duration of unemployment  
in four categories: involuntary  
job losers, voluntary job leavers, 
new labor market entrants, and  
re-entrants. Their goal was to find 
out whether there was a difference  
in length of unemployment between  
involuntary job losers (who are  
usually eligible for UI) and job leavers, 
new labor market entrants, and  
re-entrants (who usually are not).  
The results showed that involuntary  
job losers remain unemployed 
slightly longer than unemployed 
workers who are not eligible for 
benefits, indicating that extended 
UI benefits have a modest impact 
on unemployment duration. 
The economists concluded that 
the impact of extended insurance 
benefits on the unemployment 
rate for all of 2009 and the first half 
of 2010 was  about  0.8 percentage 
point. So, at the end of June 2010, 
the unemployment rate would have 
been 8.7 percent (compared with 
9.5 percent if no UI program had 
been in place). 
Another analysis looks at the broad 
economic effects of unemployment 
insurance. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia senior economist 
Shigeru Fujita contends that the 
positive relationship between the 
level of benefits and the duration of 
unemployment is socially desirable. 
The benefits can improve unem-
ployed people’s well-being, he says, 
by helping them avoid large drops 
in consumption in the face of job 
losses. 
Since UI benefits increase the 
amount of cash the unemployed 
have, their consumption is support-
ed, Fujita says, which improves the 
economy’s welfare. And when these  
workers continue to receive benefits,  
the pressure to accept a low-paying 
job is reduced. While this pattern 
initially seems counterproductive, 
it also may serve as motivation for 
creating higher-paying jobs in order 
to attract workers—another boost 
to the economy.
Moreover, UI cannot explain the 
doubling of the unemployment rate 
during the recession, even when an  
estimate of UI’s effect is on the high 
end. “I do believe that the effect 
on the unemployment rate is not 
more than 1 percentage point, 
probably less,” says Murat Tasci, an 
economist at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland who specializes in 
business cycles and labor markets. 
“My conclusion is based on my 
observation that, for most of the 
2010 2011
December 19, 2009  Expiration date extended to February 28, 2010.
March 2, 2010  Expiration date extended to April 5, 2010.
April 15, 2010  Expiration date extended to June 2, 2010.
July 22, 2010  Expiration date extended to November 30, 2010.
December 6, 2010  Federal unemployment benefits extended and 
will remain in effect through the end of 2011 for workers who have 
been laid off for more than 26 and less than 99 weeks.
November 6, 2009  Tier II benefits extended to 14 weeks and no 
longer dependent on a state’s unemployment rate; Tier III (providing 
up to 13 more weeks to those in states with an average unemployment 
rate of 6 percent or higher) and Tier IV (providing up to an additional 
six weeks if the state unemployment rate is at least 8.5 percent) 
introduced. 
period when extended unemploy-
ment insurance was in effect, job 
openings in the U.S. economy were 
at very depressed levels.” In other 
words, the unemployed couldn’t 
have gone off the rolls if they had 
wanted to—there was no work  
for them.
It’s logical that it would take some 
time for the unemployment rate to 
come down after a large shock like 
the one our nation recently experi-
enced. Tasci’s view is in keeping with 
that of many other economists: that 
a large part of the unemployment 
rate increase results from the severe 
recession and the accompanying 
decline in output, not from extended  
benefits.  ■
Recommended readings
Fujita, Shigeru. 2010. “Economic Effects of  
the Unemployment Insurance Benefit.”  
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,  
The Business Review (Q4): 20–7.
Valletta, Rob, and Katherine Kuang. 2010a.  
“Extended Unemployment and UI Benefits.”  
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,  
Economic Letter 12 (April 19).
Valletta, Rob, and Katherine Kuang. 2010b.  
“Is Structural Unemployment on the Rise?”  
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,  
Economic Letter 34 (November 8).   
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Community Relations and Education
Last summer, Congress approved the most sweeping reforms to the financial  
market regulatory system since the Great Depression with the Dodd–Frank  
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. But that was only the 
beginning. Now come the details—hammering out more than 250 rules among  
11 different regulatory agencies (the Federal Reserve itself is responsible for  
developing more than 50 new rules). Many of the rules are geared toward the 
same goal—preventing a replay of the financial crisis that crippled the economy 
from 2007 through 2009.
Rules and Regulations:  
How the Details Take Shape
 6 Winter 2011The impact of Dodd –Frank is wide and deep. It is safe  
to say this is the best opportunity for citizens to influence  
federal regulatory policy in generations.
Most people know the Federal Reserve for its highest- 
profile job—conducting monetary policy. But it’s the 
Federal Reserve Board’s role as a regulatory agency that 
empowers it to write rules to govern banks and protect 
consumers’ financial transactions. In years past, the 
Federal Reserve has aimed to protect Americans in their 
financial dealings by implementing and enforcing laws 
such as the Truth in Lending Act and the Credit Card  
Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act.
Americans have been able to comment on proposed rules 
and regulations in the federal decision-making process  
for many years, but the rule-writing phase of the Dodd–
Frank implementation provides an unusually significant 
opportunity for people to weigh in. Consider that the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was all of 31 pages long;  
the Dodd–Frank legislation was more than 2,000 pages. 
The impact of Dodd–Frank is wide and deep. It is safe to 
say this is the best opportunity for citizens to influence 
federal regulatory policy in generations. 
The Writing of a Regulation
Laws often do not include all of the details needed to  
explain how an individual, business, state or local govern-
ment, or nonprofit might follow the law. To make laws 
practical on a day-to-day basis, Congress authorizes certain  
government agencies—including the Federal Reserve’s 
Board of Governors—to create regulations.
New rules under Dodd–Frank will reach nearly every 
piece of the financial market apparatus. Among the key 
provisions:
	•  A Financial Stability Oversight Council, whose members 
include the Federal Reserve Chairman, Treasury  
Secretary, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
head, to monitor systemic risks
Regulation CC
Check Clearing for the  
21st Century Act (Check 21)
The 2003 Check 21 Act allows banks  
to process more checks electronically  
with a new negotiable instrument called  
a substitute check. If you need to retrieve  
a record of canceled checks, now you  
can see copies of check fronts and backs, 
the legal equivalent to the real thing. 
Regulation B
 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
Enacted in 2003, this regulation prohibits  
lenders from discriminating against credit 
applicants, establishes guidelines for  
gathering and evaluating credit informa-
tion, and requires written notification 
when credit is denied. 
Regulation C
 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
As amended in 2002, this regulation  
provides the public with loan data that  
can be used to help determine whether  
financial institutions are serving the housing  
needs of their communities; assists in 
identifying possible discriminatory lending 
patterns; and enforces anti-discrimination 
statutes.
Examples of Past Board of Governors Regulations 
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	•  Enhanced standards for all large bank holding companies 
—those with greater than $50 billion in assets—as well  
as certain nonbank financial firms (insurers such as AIG,  
for example)
	•  Greater transparency to the over-the-counter derivatives 
market; derivates include vehicles such as credit default 
swaps, a sort of insurance that was blamed  for the 
buildup of risk that led to the financial crisis
	•  A Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, funded by 
the Federal Reserve but operating independently, to 
administer consumer financial protection laws
And that’s just for starters. Other elements will reform the 
regulation of credit rating agencies and require registration 
by hedge fund managers with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
The rule-writing phase of Dodd–Frank began in earnest 
early last fall. By the end of 2010, the Federal Reserve, 
sometimes jointly with other agencies, had already opened  
comments for seven proposals and initiated studies on 
several others. A study of the proposed Volcker Rule,  
for example, was launched with the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to learn more about the impact of 
limiting the amount of proprietary trading—essentially, 
playing the market with their own money—that banks 
can do. In late December, the Board asked for comments 
on a rule to establish new standards on debit card inter-
change fees, trying to ensure that debit card transactions 
are reasonable and proportional to their costs.  ■
PROPOSAL AND NOTICE
■   Agency proposes regulation, issues  
a press release, and lists it in the  
Federal Register as an advance 
notice of proposed rule making, 
which invites the public to participate 
in the rulemaking process.
■    Agency sends proposed regulation  
to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for approval.
PUBLIC COMMENT
■   Public has a comment period  
(usually 30 to 90 days), during  
which time written comments  
either supporting or opposing  
the proposed regulation or ideas  
for changes can be submitted at  
www.regulations.gov or through 
specific regulatory agencies. 
  •   Comments can be simple or  
contain detailed arguments. 
  •   Anyone—from professional  
lobbying groups to organized  
interest groups to individuals— 
can submit comments on a  
proposed rule.
■   Recent research finds evidence  
that public input influences policy 
content, especially when the public  
is involved in the early stages, 
though there are conflicting opinions 
about the role that public feedback 
plays during rulemaking.
What’s the Difference  
Between a Law and a Regulation?
Law: a rule of conduct or procedure established by custom, 
agreement, or authority; once approved by Congress and the 
president, a new law is called an act
Regulation: specific requirements issued by governmental 
agencies about what is legal and what is not
Rule-making: the process by which regulations are developed
8  Winter 2011Resources
For updates on regulatory reform progress, the Federal Reserve provides 
a number of resources, including
The Federal Reserve Board’s “Regulatory Reform” news webpage at  
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform.htm
The Federal Reserve Board’s Freedom of Information Office at   
www.federalreserve.gov or www.regulations.gov, where you can view or 
comment on a proposed rule
The Federal Bank of St. Louis’ “Dodd–Frank Regulatory Reform Rules” 
webpage at www.stlouisfed.org/regreformrules
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
■   OMB reviews the proposed regula-
tion and the analysis supporting it 
and makes sure the proposal fits with 
current administrative policy. In the 
majority of cases, OMB approves the 
regulation as is.
  •   The OMB review has historically  
been a confidential process, though 
the level of confidentiality changes 
with each administration. 
  •  In recent years, special interest  
groups have  sprung up to promote  
open government, accountability, 
and citizen participation.
FINAL RULE
The agency considers all the comments,  
revises the regulation accordingly, and 
issues a final rule, which is published in 
the Federal Register.
AMENDMENTS
■   Agency proposes changes to the  
final rule, based on a new law or  
review of the regulation.
■   Changes are offered for public  
comment.
■   Final amendments are approved  
by the agency and published in the 
Federal Register.
■   If there are unusual circumstances, 
an agency may instead issue an  
interim final rule.
    9 refront FBuilding a model to forecast the condition of the financial 
system is daunting in and of itself. Before a condition can 
be forecast, it must be measured. And even before it can 
be measured, it must be defined. In developing SAFE as  
a robust tool for supervisors, we needed to take a funda-
mental step by first defining what systemic risk actually is 
and then creating a measurement of it. 
The key to defining the slippery concept of systemic risk 
depends on the ability to recognize when stress in the 
financial market reaches critical levels. While there is 
no magic threshold, it’s fair to say that the probability of 
systemically risky financial conditions rises when financial 
stress measures become elevated. Stress may be observed 
in the movements of various financial market components,  
including swings in the stock market or the rates of interest 
required to issue debt.
That’s where the financial stress index comes in. With this 
index, supervisors are better able to pinpoint when levels 
of financial market stress have reached worrisome levels. 
It’s much like the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the 
S&P 500, which are designed to measure the level and 
activity of the equity markets. Each index consists of a 
Early Warning:
Introducing the  
Cleveland Financial Stress Index
The financial crisis has raised interest around the world in developing models that 
can spot the emergence of systemic risk. Last year in these pages, we described   
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s new early warning system, SAFE—short 
for Systemic Assessment of the Financial Environment. (For an explanation of how  
SAFE helps supervisors monitor the financial landscape, see Forefront Spring 2010,   
“Spotting a Financial Crisis Before it Happens.”) Now we’d like to describe one of its 
essential elements—an index that tracks financial stress. 
Stephen Ong,  
Vice President, 
Supervision and Regulation
 10  Winter 2011unique set of components that are combined using related 
index construc tion methods. Interestingly, prior to 2007, a  
public financial stress index for U.S. financial markets did 
not exist. Since then, several have been developed, each 
with its own unique elements and methods.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has developed 
its own financial stress index for use with its SAFE early 
warning system. The Cleveland Financial Stress Index 
(CFSI) is a continuous index constructed of daily public 
market data. These data are collected from four sectors 
of the financial markets: credit markets, foreign exchange 
markets, equity markets, and interbank markets, providing  
broad coverage of elements that may be indicators of 
financial stress. 
For example, components from credit markets include 
various interest-rate spreads associated with debt instru-
ments such as bonds. These spreads indicate perceived 
risk in these instruments, and point to potential stress 
in the markets. When the spread on a typical corporate 
bond is large, for example, it suggests that investors have 
grown wary of the borrower’s ability to stay current.  
Various components from the equity markets represent 
volatility and, therefore, the degree of stress in those 
markets. In total, 11 different components derived from 
these four markets are combined into a single index that 
represents relative stress in the financial markets.
Using historical data, figure 1 depicts the CFSI and its 
measurement of stress in the financial system since 1994. 
Also included are indications of periods of financial stress 
events. Notice that the index began to spike even before the 
events in 2008 made clear the depth of the financial crisis.
Figure 2 shows the movements of specific components 
within the FSI, providing insight into the amount of 
stress that the four distinct markets of the component  
inputs contributed to the overall index. As the figure shows,  
the component from the foreign exchange market contrib-
uted substantially less to overall financial stress than did 
the other markets. Measures from the credit, interbank, 
and equity markets indicate significant levels of stress from 
each, contributing to the overall financial stress of the 
recent crisis. 
The CFSI is not designed to predict, but rather to reflect, 
current relative levels of systemic financial stress. It is 
what’s known as a coincident indicator. That said, its use 
of daily data—rather than less-frequent data, such as 
weekly or monthly input—provides earlier indications 
of the existence of stress in the financial markets. Used in 
tandem with our SAFE early warning system, the CFSI 
acts as a robust measure of stress in the financial markets.  
In addition, the design of the index and its use of com-
ponents from four distinct financial markets allow for 
identification of the origin of the stress. To supervisors 
charged with alleviating systemic risk, this is useful 














































Figure 1. Cleveland Financial Stress Index
Figure 2. Components of the Financial Stress Index
Note: First shaded bar represents the onset of the crisis and the second-steepest 
rise on record; second shaded bar represents the peak of the crisis.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 









The Cleveland Financial Stress Index will be posted on the Bank’s 
homepage. Watch for it at 
www.clevelandfed.org
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Credit  Interbank  Equity  Foreign exchange 
market  market  market  marketAmong the many unwanted things that taxpayers get 
socked with during a financial crisis is a portfolio of 
deeply distressed assets—loans gone sour, millions of 
them, many of them sliced and bundled into securities 
that nobody can sell because nobody wants to buy. The 
overwhelming uncertainty around these troubled assets 
can paralyze the financial system. Almost inevitably, they 
fall into the government’s hands as a side effect of efforts 
to rehabilitate the financial system and restore credit flows.  
It’s an important and necessary step in nursing the finan-
cial market back to health. The government usually takes 
possession of troubled assets either through receivership 
of failing financial institutions or through programs that 
strip distressed assets from struggling but still open-and-
operating financial firms.1 
These assets often go by the infamous term “toxic assets,” 
the likes of which throttled so many financial institutions 
in 2008 and 2009. And despite the economic damage they  
did over the past few years, the problem of what to do about  
them persists. Elements of the Dodd–Frank legislation 
go a long way toward averting and dealing with financial 
market meltdowns, as the legislation establishes a separate 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolution 
authority for nonbank financial firms. But absent from 
this legislation are provisions for handling troubled assets 
on the scale generated during a financial meltdown. 
It is true that the FDIC’s receivership operations are 
set up to dispose of the assets from the estates of failed 
financial firms during non-crisis times. U.S. federal deposit 
agencies are funded by assessments on the industries they 
insure, which limits their resources for dealing with large-
scale banking problems. 
In other words, the FDIC’s operations currently are not 
geared toward dealing with the volume of distressed assets 
that would likely need to be managed in the aftermath of a 
financial crisis; systemic crises require the marshalling of 
resources beyond those normally available to the deposit 
guarantor. Hence, there is a need for an institution whose 
sole purpose is large-scale asset salvage—to acquire,  
manage, and then dispose of the overhang of distressed 
assets on the books of banks and other financial firms. 
How to Build a Bad Bank 
 —for the Greater Good
James B. Thomson,  
Vice President 
and Financial Economist
 1.  The originally planned use of the $700 billion in TARP funds was to strip 
(through an outright purchase of) distressed assets from the balance sheets  
of banks, thrifts, and nonbank financial firms.
12   Winter 2011Such an institution is not a new concept. The government 
and even the private sector have created special-purpose 
entities to deal with troubled assets in all of the recent 
financial crises. From the Great Depression to the 1980s 
savings and loan debacle, vehicles of this sort have played 
a role in getting the financial market functioning again. 
   Some have done their jobs quite well; others not. 
     Drawing on these lessons, I propose the creation of  
      a resolution management corporation, or RMC. Call   
   it an asset-salvage entity, or bad bank. The RMC that I  
propose would be sponsored by and operated by the federal  
govern ment. It would become operational only in response 
to a financial crisis where the volume of troubled assets 
that needs to be managed and disposed of exceeds the 
capacity of the FDIC’s receivership operations.  
The RMC’s overarching goal: restoration of a stable, healthy 
financial system at a minimal cost. 
The Trouble with Assets 
An asset is said to be troubled, toxic, impaired—pick  
your term—under a number of different conditions. If it 
is a mortgage loan, it may be “nonperforming,” that is, the 
borrower is no longer making payments. It could be an  
entire bundle of mortgages made to subprime borrowers, 
in which case finding a market value may be impossible. 
It’s like a carton of eggs in a supermarket. They might  
appear to be fine eggs, but if shoppers suspect they might 
be tainted on the inside, the eggs might not sell at any 
price. The market reaction to toxic assets is much the same.
These toxic assets, if large enough in scale, could wreak 
havoc on the economy. Financial institutions are reluctant 
to sell them, because the markets for these assets, if working 
at all, tend to be very thin. The problem is made worse 
if financial firms holding the assets are undercapitalized 
and likely reluctant to undertake any actions that would 
require them to recognize losses on these assets. Creditors 
and counterparties grow nervous about doing business 
with toxic-asset-owning financial institutions. Over time, 
the uncertainty bleeds out into the real economy, freezing 
the fundamental financial-sector activities of facilitating 
people’s and firms’ borrowing, saving, and investing. 
The logic of stripping away toxic assets from their current 
owners is the same as ripping off a bandage—it hurts, but 
it’s best to get it over with quickly. Otherwise, you only 
prolong the pain. 
History clearly teaches us the downside of nursing along 
struggling firms—from the savings and loan industry in 
the 1980s to Japan’s banks in the 1990s. Instead of shutting  
them down and seizing their assets, the government 
Some Bad Banks of the Past
  Reconstruction  FDIC rescue of   
  Finance Corp.  Continental Illinois  Grant Street Bank  Resolution Trust Corp.
Year established  1932  1984   1988   1989
Purpose  Varied, but shifted to solvency   Take out problem loans,    Split Mellon Bank into two,   Manage and dispose of 
  support of banking industry  place them in a “bad bank,”   with good assets remaining in  assets that came into the 
    leave the performing loans in  original bank and bad assets  government’s hands from 
    Continental Illinois  moving to Grant Street  the estates of failed thrifts
Structure   Purchased equities from troubled  Part of FDIC operations  Separately chartered and  Constrained by funding 
  institutions as a means  to     capitalized bank  limits; lacked a clear mission 
  recapitalize them; established       and had competing objectives;  
  with its own balance sheet,        no clear exit strategy 
  funded largely by issuing its own  
  debt claims
Results  Somewhat successful  Successfully allocated cash flows   Effective liquidation of Mellon’s  Delays in bringing troubled 
    associated with the distressed   troubled assets by tying returns  assets from zombie thrifts 
    assets between the existing   to Mellon directly to the recovery  into the RTC’s portfolio, 
    shareholders and the FDIC  value of Grant Street’s troubled  with negative implications 
      assets, aligning incentives  for asset recovery value
Authority  Federal law—Reconstruction and  Existing FDIC authority  Private company action   Federal law—Financial 
structure  Finance Corporation Act of 1932       Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
         and Enforcement Act of 1989
    13 refront FThe troubled assets—mortgage securities and so forth—
would be set in a pile and valued as fairly as possible 
(which, granted, could prove difficult). The creditors 
might receive a certificate with a percentage claim to any 
future cash flows from the asset. There might even be a 
certain comfort level in handing over the assets because of 
the next stage of the process.
 2   A simple, unambiguous mission: A resolution manage-
ment corporation should aim to maximize net recoveries 
on the portfolio of distressed assets under its manage-
ment. Period.
The bad bank must quickly return assets to the private 
sector at the highest possible recovery value. A fast realiza-
tion of losses is the surest path to economic recovery, as  
financial market players can effectively take their lumps and 
move on. The sick institutions themselves could be passed 
into a bridge institution where they would be recapitalized,  
and the bad assets moved into the resolution management 
corporation for management and rehabilitation. 
If it’s a security with, say, parts of 1,000 subprime mortgages, 
there may be no initial market in which to sell it. So the 
RMC would hold the security, and perhaps even take the 
time and effort to “rehabilitate” some of its underlying 
mortgages. Perhaps a certain homeowner had been out 
of work and not paying, but then found a job. The RMC 
could conceivably be the one that makes the phone calls 
to get the borrower back on a payment schedule, even if  
at a reduced rate.
There must be confidence that the bad bank will care for 
the assets and then speedily return them to the private 
sector, or be held responsible if not. The Government  
Accountability Office should conduct periodic audits; 
Congress should hear regular testimony from the bad 
bank’s chief; and Congress should establish an independent 
body to oversee the operations and activities.
 3   Adequate resources: Bad banks need funding and  
staffing. The funding is to pay for operations and costs 
associated with stripping troubled assets from the failing 
institution.
The independent bad bank should be given a revolving line 
of credit with the U.S. Treasury, enough to fund operations 
during the start-up period—perhaps about $100 billion. 
injected these firms with liquidity and capital, further 
exacerbating and extending the economic decline. By one 
study (DeGennaro and Thomson), regulatory forbearance 
—a policy of delaying a receivership process—quadrupled 
the cost of the savings and loan crisis for taxpayers.
Until now, the way the government has gone about 
trying to restore order hasn’t been very systematic. Past 
experience with bad banks is mixed. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation had some success in setting up 
a bad bank to handle the rescue of Continental Illinois 
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago in May 1984; the 
1989-created Resolution Trust Corporation, by contrast, 
was hobbled for various reasons in its ability to manage 
assets from failed thrift institutions (see box: Some Bad 
Banks of the Past, page 13).
Four Keys
So, how should we go about establishing an effective bad 
bank? Four features are crucial to the proper design of my 
proposed resolution management corporation:
 1   Transparency and accountability: Taxpayers need to be 
able to track losses and gains. This can be accomplished  
by a crystal-clear separation between the “good” and 
“bad” assets, acknowledging at the start the losses from  
toxic assets and the costs associated with managing and 
disposing of them. This allows for an auditable allocation 
of losses, which in turn properly aligns incentives for  
efficient management and disposition of the toxic assets.
The more transparent decisions are at the beginning, 
the more likely it will be that the financial system can be 
rehabilitated quickly and credit flows restored. A straight-
forward way to accomplish a transparent separation of 
toxic assets from the financial system would be to put the 
failing institution through a receivership process.
A systemic regulator—perhaps the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System along with either the FDIC, 
the SEC (for securities broker–dealers), or the Federal 
Insurance Office (for insurance companies), in consultation 
with the Secretary of the Treasury—would make the call 
on which firms should pass into receivership. 
14  Winter 2011Edward Kane, a Boston College economist, laid out the basic principles 
for an effective asset-salvage entity more than 20 years ago. The entity 
charged with maximizing net recovery on troubled assets needs to be 
proficient in:
 • rescue (peril reduction)
 •  appraisal (damage evaluation, that is, documenting and valuing 
inventories of damaged goods)
Kane’s Principles for Unconflicted Asset Salvage
 •  property management (efficiently protecting and enhancing  
existing value)
 •  sales (searching out potential buyers, communicating appraisal infor-
mation to them, and running auctions or bargaining for the best price)
Moreover, for effective asset salvage, the public salvor must have access 
to experts in each core activity as well as experts on the specific types of 
assets that come under its supervision.
In this initial phase, the bad bank can acquire assets in 
a manner that preserves their value and reduces losses 
that insolvent and possibly neglectful institutions had let 
mount. After that, the bad bank should seek permanent 
operational funding from direct Congressional appropria-
tions and issuance of bonds. The principal and interest on  
the bonds would be funded through the (eventual) liqui-
dation of the assets. Because assets should be acquired at  
fair value, little or no additional funding should be required  
to cover shortfalls in the value of assets sold. 
However structured, a bad bank should essentially be 
established as a shelf organization. Its charter, funding  
authority, and authorization for staffing and other resources 
would always be in place, but the RMC itself would be 
dormant until activated. And that activation should happen  
only in case of a real fire—a widespread financial crisis, not  
the sort of higher-frequency disruptions that are normal 
in a cycle. Who would declare the RMC’s activation is a 
matter of preference—it could be the FDIC’s board, the 
newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, or some combination of these.
 4   A limited life span: Once the troubled assets have been 
repaired and re-sold, the bad bank can fold up.
Establishing a fixed expiration date clearly ties the existence  
of the RMC to its function. Ten years seems like a reason-
able maximum life for such an entity. Once the need for  
the function goes away, the RMC does, too. It also reduces  
incentives to speculate on asset-recovery values by limiting  
the maximum time any asset can be held. There is also the 
more technical but important benefit of easing uncertainty  
among market players about who will issue claims against 
the expected cash flows from the troubled assets. They 
will have a rough idea when the cash will start flowing, 
because they know the bad bank will cease to exist when 
its job is done. Any assets remaining on the RMC’s books 
when its charter expires could be turned over to the FDIC’s  
receivership function for eventual sale or liquidation.
A Necessary Reform
The way we respond to crises can either help or hinder the 
recovery. The establishment of a government-chartered 
RMC could go a long way along the “helping” path. At 
best, a national “bad bank” should be seen as a complement 
to other financial-crisis rescue efforts. We will still need 
emergency liquidity and credit programs, for example. 
But financial crises have grown more frequent in recent 
decades. Perhaps if we had a system for dealing with the 
most troubled assets up front, we would lessen the need 
to deal with another crisis in the near future.  ■
 Source:  Kane, Edward J. 1990. “Principal–Agent Problems in S&L Salvage.” The Journal of Finance 45(3): 755-64.
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    15 refront FTo measure a bank’s strength, one could look at factors 
like profitability or stock price, but few gauges are as 
revealing as a bank’s capital level. That is why supervisors 
are increasingly turning to formal capital regulation as a 
way to promote financial stability. The belief is that the 
stronger individual institutions are, the safer the entire 
financial system will be.
But capital requirements can have unintended effects  
because they tend to be “procyclical.”  During economic 
expansions, banks need a smaller equity cushion to absorb  
unanticipated losses in their assets than they do during 
contractions. As a result, they increase leverage to accom-
modate credit demand in good times. They see little need 
to boost capital levels when credit losses are low and  
expected to remain that way. But in bad times, higher credit-
default rates force banks to eat into their capital buffers. 
Faced with continued losses, banks look to conserve their 
remaining capital, partly by reducing the credit supply.  
The upshot of procyclical capital requirements is that 
economic swings are more intense than they otherwise 
would be. This is how credit bubbles are formed and burst.
That’s what happened in the Panic of 2008, when the 
banking system corrected for its earlier exuberance by  
dramatically curtailing lending activity and hoarding capital.  
How can we avoid that problem in the future? How can 
regulators encourage financial institutions to increase their  
capital in good times, anticipating their needs when times 
turn bad? How can we start thinking about the merits of 
countercyclical capital requirements? 
Last October, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland held 
a conference to address these questions.
Keeping Banks Strong— 
Countercyclical Capital Requirements 
Joseph Haubrich, 
Vice President and Economist 
James B. Thomson,  
Vice President 
and Financial Economist
16   Winter 2011Canada offers an interesting case study for the United States. Although  
their economies are closely connected, the two nations’ banking 
sectors differ in both structure and performance. Canada’s system is 
dominated by a handful of nationwide banking companies. The United 
States has more than 10,000 insured depository institutions and, 
although it has a few mega-banks, it has no truly nationwide bank. 
Guidara and his colleagues note that besides the Basel international 
capital standards, Canadian banks are subject to a leveraging constraint 
that could be adjusted according to the phases of the business cycle, 
producing what’s known as a variable capital buffer. U.S. banks are 
also subject to a leveraging constraint, but theirs is fixed and cannot 
change with the business cycle. 
Spain provides another useful model for countercyclical regulatory  
policy. In Canada, the buildup of capital buffers might simply represent  
passive accumulation of earnings during a strong growth phase. But 
starting in 2000, Spain adopted a policy of countercyclical loan-loss 
provisioning, which sets aside reserves when bank profits are high 
and loan growth is strong. 
By forcing banks to set aside reserves in good times, the policy reduces 
the near-term profitability of bank lending and reduces incentives 
to overlend. In doing so, this policy tames procyclicality in the bank 
credit cycle. Dynamic provisioning also reduces the impact of loan 
portfolio deterioration on bank credit decisions. This happens be-
cause reserves for loan losses can be drawn down during recessions, 
lessening the need to set aside additional earnings to cover them.  
Calomiris reminds us that formal capital regulation is a relatively 
modern phenomenon. For most of U.S. banking history, supervision  
focused on liquidity (the liability side of the balance sheet rather than  
the asset side). Because banks’ liabilities—banknotes before the 
Federal Reserve era and bank deposits after—are an important part 
of the money supply, regulation ensured that banks could meet 
maturing obligations, particularly during periods of financial distress. 
A bank’s failure to redeem banknotes or inability to offset deposit 
withdrawals would mean closing its doors. Bank clearinghouses arose 
in the nineteenth century partly to provide a liquidity backstop for 
their members and, sometimes, for the broader banking system.
A lesson from the past, which was relearned during the crisis of 
2007–09, is that general market liquidity tends to dry up in response 
to shocks to the system, particularly when firms start hoarding their 
liquidity as part of a preservation strategy. To put it another way, a 
source of liquidity is protective only if it can be tapped during a crisis.  
Performance, Risk, and Capital Buffer under Business Cycles and  
Banking Regulations: Evidence from the Canadian Banking Sector 
Countercyclical Provisions, Managerial Discretion,  
and Loan Growth: The Case of Spain 
The Trade-offs between Capital and Liquidity  
Requirements: Theory, History, and Empirical Evidence 
by Alaa Guidara, Van Son Lai, and Issouf Soumaré  
(Laval University, Québec)
by Santiago Carbó-Valverde and Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández  
(University of Granada)
by Charles Calomiris  
(Columbia University)
To see how capital buffers affect the Canadian banking system’s  
performance, the authors test the relationship between changes 
in the capital buffer, bank risk, and bank performance. They find 
evidence that Canadian capital buffers tend to be countercyclical. 
Moreover, they find a positive relationship between Canadian banks’ 
capital buffers and their riskiness.
What these authors do not account for, however, is that Canadian 
banks are likely to have higher charter values than their U.S. counter-
parts—and charter values act as a constraint on risk-taking. If this 
structure results in Canadian banks having high charter values, then 
they would be expected to hold less risky portfolios than U.S. banks 
and be better positioned to weather an economic downturn.
To analyze how Spain’s dynamic provisioning policy affects loan 
growth, the authors use quarterly data on a sample of Spanish banks 
from the first quarter of 2001 through the first quarter of 2010. They 
test whether loan-loss provisioning in Spain before and during the 
financial crisis resulted in procyclical reserving, income smoothing, 
countercyclical loan growth, or some combination of them. Overall, 
they find evidence of procyclical reserving and income smoothing, 
although both of these effects decrease over the sample period.  
The authors do not, however, find evidence that dynamic loan-loss  
provisioning dampened loan growth at the peak of the credit cycle. 
That is to say, the Spanish policy failed to do one of its most impor-
tant jobs—smoothing loan growth over the credit cycle by reducing 
incentives to overlend during the peak of the cycle.
The next iteration of the Basel international capital accords (Basel III) 
will include two kinds of liquidity standard. One is a coverage ratio 
that requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand 30 days of 
net cash outflows. The other is a net stable funding ratio that aims to 
lessen mismatches between the maturity structures of assets and  
liabilities. For example, a bank wouldn’t want to have all of its assets in 
long-term mortgages and most of its liabilities in short-term deposits. 
Liquidity risk also gets attention in the 2010 regulatory reform act.  
Calomiris argues that regulatory policy should refocus on liquidity  
and liquidity risk. But when establishing liquidity standards, the devil 
is in the details. As Calomiris sees it, a practical approach to measuring  
liquidity and implementing liquidity standards remains elusive. An 
open question is whether policymakers’ current efforts to reward 
financial market firms for limiting liquidity risk will prove productive. 
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Incentive Compensation, Accounting Discretion, and Bank Capital
 
Accounting for Banks, Capital Regulation, and Risk-Taking  
 
Countercyclical Regulation under Collateralized Lending
by Timothy W. Koch, Dan Waggoner, and Larry D. Wall  
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta)
by Jing Li  
(Carnegie Mellon University)
by Laura Valderrama  
(International Monetary Fund)
Most writing on regulatory reform doesn’t bother with connections;  
it often treats the effects of policy in isolation. A useful corrective to 
this practice is provided by researchers at the Atlanta Fed, who look  
at how new regulatory guidance on bankers’ pay will interact with  
accounting rules to affect how banks adjust their capital buffer in good  
times and bad.
Because accounting rules allow discretion in how firms report  
gains and losses, it’s not surprising that firms engage in earnings  
management, generally smoothing their earnings over time. Nor  
is it surprising that bankers’ compensation affects how they smooth 
earnings. And because retained earnings increase bank capital, and 
declaring losses lowers it, anything that affects earnings management  
affects bank capital.  
Regulatory guidance on compensation will have somewhat contradic-
tory effects on the cyclicality of bank capital. A lot depends on whether  
the banker’s pay is based more on accounting earnings or on stock 
Li formulates the regulatory question as one of choosing a capital  
requirement and how bank capital is measured (that is, the accounting  
standard). The question comes down to which accounting regime 
most effectively controls excessive risk-taking by banks, given that 
the regulations can have costly side effects.
The paper considers three accounting regimes: “historical cost”  
accounting, in which assets are valued at their historical price; “lower 
of cost or market value” accounting; and “fair value” accounting, in 
which assets are marked to market prices. The accounting regime 
that is adopted may effectively reduce capital, driving levels below 
what regulators require and forcing an intervention. For example,  
under fair-value accounting, a drop in the price of the asset would show  
up as a loss, reducing capital, while value measured at historical cost 
would show no change.  If, as seems likely, asset prices move along 
with the business cycle, the choice of accounting standard also affects 
the amount of cyclicality in bank capital.
Some banking historians have described the evolution of the recent 
financial crisis as a run on collateral, especially in the repo market, 
where institutions agree to sell securities and then repurchase them 
at a specified date and price.  
Bank capital regulation that focuses on credit risk doesn’t prevent the 
type of contagion that exists in the interbank collateralized lending 
markets. After all, the banks in Valderrama’s model are assumed to 
price. If it’s earnings, the new guidance will reinforce the current counter-
cyclical pattern that results from smoothing earnings. With more 
compensation coming from deferred bonuses with a potential claw-
back (that is, the ability of the firm or regulators to seek repayment 
of some or all of a bonus payment), managers will want to make sure 
earnings stay steady in the future, so that they actually see that bonus 
when it is due to arrive. And with less sensitivity to performance, 
bumping up earnings this year won’t add a lot to that bonus.  
Putting more of the bonuses in stock, the other alternative, could 
have the opposite effect. Managers could want a high price when 
they sell their stock or exercise their options, so they might want to 
goose earnings in the short term to boost share prices when they sell.  
The upshot is that incentive guidance on capital may have ambiguous 
effects, which is less than satisfying. But there is really a larger point at  
stake—the need to consider these sorts of interactions when making 
policy, setting regulations, or establishing guidance. 
Which accounting standard is best? The answer depends partly on 
which comes first, the accounting standard or the capital requirement. 
The government might coordinate these requirements, but the Federal 
Reserve and the Financial Accounting Standards Board are quite 
independent of each other.  
Overall, regulators face a rather complicated problem. Capital 
requirements can reduce risk, but setting them too high shrinks the 
banking system and reduces the liquidity they provide. Adopting the 
appropriate accounting standard can help, but at the cost of curtailing 
bank loans to productive enterprises. Regulators must balance the 
relative importance of two bank activities: funding new businesses 
and providing deposit accounts. Instead of coming to a once-and-for-
all decision, Li’s paper highlights the trade-offs and tough choices that 
banking regulators and accounting boards must face.
be default-free. So she proposes that regulators adopt policies that 
deal specifically with the “spread of systemic liquidity risk” through 
collateral runs. She shows that under certain conditions, adding a 
liquidity buffer, a capital buffer, or a regulatory haircut on collateral 
could reduce the probability of a repurchase run and help stabilize 
financial markets.
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Credit Derivatives and the  
Default Risk of Large, Complex Financial Institutions
 
Managing Credit Booms and Busts 
by Giovanni Calice (University of Southampton),  
Christos Ioannidis (University of Bath), and  
Julian M. Williams (University of Aberdeen) 
by Olivier Jeanne (Johns Hopkins University) and  
Anton Korinek (University of Maryland)
Resources
Countercyclical capital requirements are the subject of some proposed 
rules under the Dodd–Frank Act. For more information, see   
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform.htm
Conference on Countercyclical Capital Requirements
For links to conference papers, go to  
www.clevelandfed.org/research/conferences/2010/ 
10-14-2010_capital/index.cfm 
These authors explore a method of setting explicit numerical values 
for bank capital requirements. By looking at the risk in 16 large, 
complex institutions as well as the risk in the market for credit default 
swaps, their paper paints an intriguing picture of risk transmission.  
The story begins with a standard measure of risk that comes from  
Nobel Prize winner Robert Merton, something called distance to  
default. Let’s say the bank owns a portfolio of assets—loans, govern-
ment bonds, cash in its ATMs—and that its portfolio is risky. Loans  
may go bad, bond prices may fall, and robbers may steal the cash.  
The bank also has debts, mainly to depositors but also to investors 
who have bought senior and subordinated bonds. Merton assumes 
that when the value of the assets falls below the value of the debt, 
the firm is bankrupt and must close down (this leaves out accounting 
issues, such as when the value is declared—admittedly important  
but sometimes a distraction).  
How far is the bank from defaulting? The distance-to-default approach  
starts by finding out the bank portfolio’s risk or, put another way, its 
variability. This is measured in standard deviations, perhaps familiar 
from statistics classes. The distance to default is the number of standard 
deviations that the bank’s value must fall before it drops below the 
value of the debt. The more standard deviations, the further the  
distance to default and the lower the chance of failure. Using standard 
The authors ask how policymakers should respond to the continual 
booms and busts in credit and asset markets. They point out that if 
there is too much of something, one solution is to tax it. They argue 
that there is too much borrowing, and prescribe a “pigouvian tax” 
(after Arthur Pigou, the late Cambridge University economist). Of 
course, this adds the problem of determining the right tax level, 
which Jeanne and Korinek tackle.  
The root of the problem is that excessive borrowing makes the 
economy vulnerable to a feedback spiral when an adverse shock 
arrives. Falling housing prices, worsening unemployment, or other 
shocks make credit tighter, so people spend less. This further reduces 
asset values and makes credit even tighter, continuing the downward 
spiral. So the financial system exacerbates booms and busts in credit 
and asset markets and, ultimately, in output and employment.  
deviations allows us to compare the riskiness of different-sized banks. 
It would also make sense to declare a distance-to-default equivalent 
to how much money a bank would have to lose to become insolvent, 
but that might make a bigger bank look safer than a small one, even  
if their chance of failure is the same.   
It turns out that the distances to default of large, complex financial 
institutions (like Citigroup and Goldman Sachs) often move together.  
The distances also move together with the volatility of two indexes 
of credit-default-swap markets. Credit default swaps are a way to 
protect against bonds defaulting. One party to the swap “buys  
protection,” paying what amounts to an insurance premium. The  
other party “sells protection” by agreeing to make a large payment 
if the bond defaults. There are two indexes for stocks, the Dow Jones 
and the S&P; likewise, there are two indexes for credit defaults, the 
iTraxx and the CDX. Using these indexes, Calice and his colleagues 
show that the volatilities of bank assets and credit default swaps 
move together.  The  authors put this down to the transmission of 
volatility across banks via credit default swaps.  
Furthermore, the distance to default measure provides a natural 
stress test for a bank’s capital: Is the capital buffer large enough to 
make default unlikely? The influence of the aggregate iTraxx and  
CDX indexes, then, adds a cyclical component across firms.  
Curiously, the authors’ solution—to discourage excessive borrowing 
by taxing it—is exactly the opposite of U.S. policy, which subsidizes 
borrowing by making interest tax deductible for businesses and home 
mortgages.  
Jeanne and Korinek then take a step that too often is skipped: They 
set out to quantify how much tax should be levied. Using U.S. data, 
they estimate that imposing an additional tax of 0.5 percent  on 
household borrowing, and slightly more on business borrowing, 
would counteract the effect of excessive borrowing. For example, 
households might pay 4.5 percent instead of 4 percent on a loan.  
Furthermore, the tax rate should vary with the business cycle. In  
a boom, the tax slows the growth of debt; but during a recession,  
the tax drops to avoid a worse decrease in spending.  ■
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sits vacant or abandoned, according to the U.S. Postal  
Service. In this environment, private investment in fore-
closed properties may sound like welcome news. Indeed, 
some speculative purchases can add liquidity to a distressed  
market and help heal distressed neighborhoods when 
properties are purchased for rehabilitation. 
But if speculators fail to keep up with maintenance and 
taxes, allowing properties to sit empty and in disrepair, the 
opposite happens. In weak-market cities like Cleveland, 
some speculative investments extend the time that prop-
erties sit vacant, lower the value of nearby homes, and make 
the vacancy problem much more challenging to fix.
But are such speculative investments a large enough 
problem to demand a policy response? We believe they 
are. Evidence shows that some investors may be transacting  
irresponsibly, potentially hurting neighboring homeowners  
in the process. We outline one of many policy options 
states might consider if they are looking for solutions to 
this problem.
Financing Holds the Key
The key to understanding—and addressing—these 
harmful transactions is to look at how most speculative 
transactions are financed. When a homebuyer applies for a 
mortgage, the bank requires that all claims on the property,  
including tax and code enforcement liens, be paid off by 
the closing. Banks also require that past-due taxes that 
have not yet become liens be paid prior to closing, so they 
do not supersede the bank’s claim on the property. 
But speculative home purchase transactions are not always  
funded through the banking system. If investors pay cash 
or secure nonbank seller financing, they can postpone 
paying off liens, past due taxes, and housing code assess-
ments against the property, often for many years.
To address this problem, policymakers would need a rule 
that discourages investors from trying to quickly flip low-
value properties without maintaining or improving them. 
One potential solution would require that all past-due taxes  
and code enforcement penalties be cleared before county 
recorders declare a property transfer official. This change 
would target the speculative activity that destabilizes weak 
housing markets. 
This rule would apply to all residential property transfers 
but, in practice, would affect only the cash or seller-
financed transfers of property with outstanding taxes or 
housing code assessments. To see how widespread cash and  
seller-financed transactions are, we analyzed the property 
transfers in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (home to Cleveland),  
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV,  
Economist 
Slowing Speculation:  
A Proposal to Lessen  
Undesirable Housing Transactions
O. Emre Ergungor,   
Senior Research Economist 
20   Winter 2011in 2009. Transfers totaled 16,828 excluding foreclosures; 
about half of them did not have any associated mortgage 
as reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. 
That is, they were most likely all-cash or seller-financed 
transactions. All transactions with conveyance amounts 
less than $10,000 (almost 3,000 of them) were in this 
category. Of those small-dollar transactions, almost one  
in three had a tax delinquency at the time of transfer.
We do not suggest that all of these transactions involved 
harmful speculation, as many delinquencies clear around 
the time of the transfer. For a significant number of prop-
erties, however, tax delinquency is persistent or grows 
after the transfer. These are the properties that will likely 
be affected by this proposal. (Note: While we include  
housing code assessments in our proposal, we are unable to  
report the data on this component of the problem because  
of lack of uniform record-keeping across municipalities.) 
Undesirable Housing Transactions  
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio
We consider speculation harmful when the buyer has 
no intention of improving or maintaining the property 
or paying its taxes—but expects to resell as much of its 
stock as possible quickly, “as is,” and at a small markup. 
Speculators tend to factor in the probability that some 
of their purchased properties will languish or be lost to 
tax foreclosure. But they buy them anyway because the 
markup on properties sold is high enough to pay for the 
lost properties. 
Keep in mind that a markup as low as a few hundred  
dollars can still provide a significant return in places such 
as Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where more than 40 percent 
of properties sold by financial institutions after a fore-
closure are priced at less than $10,000, according to a 2008 
Case Western Reserve University study (see “Resources” 
at the end of this article). This speculative activity seems 
to be most common among bulk buyers who purchase 
low-value properties in large numbers.
How is this strategy profitable? When buying foreclosed or  
lender or real estate-owned (REO) properties, irresponsible  
buyers have a built-in advantage over rehabbers. While  
rehabbers must take into account the costs of improvements  
and delinquent tax payments, speculators who plan to flip 
the property at a quick profit don’t, so they can bid higher. 
Typically, after taking over the property, the speculator 
sells it as soon as possible to an unsuspecting out-of-state 
(or even out-of-country) buyer who believes the property 
is a great investment. 
This belief could be rooted in the promise of future  
appreciation or a predictable rental income stream after 
minor rehabilitation. Only after the transaction closes does  
the new buyer find out that the property has more in 
delinquent taxes than the price paid to acquire it, or that 
the property is in need of substantially more rehabilitation 
than was originally thought. More often than not in these 
situations, the new buyer abandons the property, which 
may go into tax foreclosure and be sold at auction, where 
it may once again be acquired by a bulk buyer. As this 
cycle continues, the property remains vacant, falls into 
further disrepair, and becomes a nuisance to the entire 
neighborhood. 
Consider what would happen if these speculators didn’t 
exist. First, distressed property values would fall, freeing  
up resources for rehabbing or demolition. Second, a large 
amount of distressed property would go on the market,  
which would allow for large-scale rehabilitation, redevelop-
ment, or demolition and the associated economies of scale. 
We consider speculation harmful when the buyer has no  
intention of improving or maintaining the property or paying 
its taxes—but expects to resell as much of its stock as possible 
quickly, “as is,” and at a small markup.    
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acquires distressed properties to demolish, rehabilitate, or 
repurpose for long-term neighborhood stability) has been 
able to regularly solicit bids in small and bulk packages for 
demolition as its inventory has grown. As a result, the land 
bank reports that it has seen its average demolition cost 
fall by nearly 35 percent. 
Substantiating Anecdotes: Data on  
Housing Transactions and Tax Delinquency
Some transactions illustrate the bulk-buyer business model.  
For example, Cuyahoga County records show that one 
tax-delinquent property was acquired by a bulk buyer from  
a securitization pool for $1 and resold four days later for  
$10,000. The new owner (a low-volume investor) resold 
the property six months later for $72,000. 
A fascinating transaction, but how frequently are properties  
sold in bulk transactions? And what is the evidence for 
harmful activity? We looked at the period from 2007 to 
2009 and divided investors into groups: high-volume 
(large) investors, who purchased or sold 11 or more prop-
erties, and low-volume (small) investors, who purchased 
or sold four to 10 properties. The great majority of trans-
actions occur among people who buy or sell three or less 
properties over four years; we classify those as “individuals” 
buying or selling for consumption purposes.
Cuyahoga County Auditor’s records show that of 18,692 
residential properties sold out of foreclosure by financial 
institutions and government agencies in the 2007–09 
period, about one-quarter were bought by large investors, 
another one-quarter by small investors, and most of the 
rest by individuals. As figure 1 shows, 31 percent of the 
properties bought by large investors were still vacant as of 
June 2010.  
The vacancy rate was 22 percent for small investors and 
15 percent for individuals (and these differences persist 
after controlling for property characteristics). Clearly, 
outcomes for homes bought by some investors are worse 
than for those bought by others.
Furthermore, large investors seem to have a preference 
for tax-delinquent properties. In 2009, 21 percent of the 
properties sold with a tax delinquency from the previous  
year were purchased by large investors. Yet, they purchased  
only 9 percent of properties sold without a delinquency.
This preference for tax-delinquent properties wouldn’t 
matter if the buyers paid those taxes, but that isn’t the case.  
The weighted average of the green bars in figure 2 shows that  
44 percent of the properties purchased by large investors  
in 2009 were later tax-delinquent, despite being current the 
previous year. Comparable figures are 39 percent for small  
investors and 21 percent for individ uals. In trans actions 
where large investors sell to small and other large investors  
(red and green bars farthest to the right in figure 2), this 
pattern is particularly pronounced. In almost 60 percent of  
such transactions, the purchaser does not pay property taxes.
Meanwhile, the data show that when individuals and 
financial institutions (yellow and blue bars in figure 3) 
purchase a tax-delinquent property from any group,  
delinquencies consistently get paid more than half of the 
time. Large investors, however, consistently avoid paying 
back taxes. The most glaring result is when large investors  
sell tax-delinquent property to other large investors; 
delinquent taxes are paid in only 13 percent of those cases 
(green bar farthest to the right in figure 3). When large 
investors sell to small investors, back taxes are paid in  
23 percent of the trans actions (red bar farthest to the right 
in figure 3). Added up, the data show that most of the 
time, individuals transact more responsibly than small 
and large investors. 
A final situation worth paying attention to is when a prop-
erty’s tax balance actually grows after a purchase (figure 4).  
In these transactions, not only are back taxes not being paid,  
but purchasers are not paying current taxes as they come 
due. Again, the culprits are mostly large investors who sell 
to other large investors (green bar farthest to the right in 
figure 4)—who allow the delinquent tax balance to grow 
nearly 76 percent of the time. In almost all types of property 
transfers, investors are the worst tax avoiders.
Figure 1.   Outcomes for Homes Sold out of Foreclosure  
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 2007–09










22   Winter 2011Figure 2.   Properties That Fell into Tax Delinquency
Figure 4.   Properties Whose Tax Balance Grew  
after a Purchase
Figure 3a.   Properties That Became Current: 
Low-value Transactions
Figure 3.   Properties That Became Current
Figure 2a.   Properties That Fell into Tax Delinquency:  
Low-value Transactions
Figure 4a.   Properties Whose Tax Balance Grew  
after a Purchase: Low-value Transactions
Status Changes of Tax-Delinquent Properties in Cuyahoga County, Ohio,  
by Seller and Buyer Type, 2009
Note: Low-value transactions have conveyance amounts of less than $10,000. 
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  support the anecdotal reports  
  that large and small investors  
  pay the taxes on properties 
they purchase less frequently than financial institutions,  
governments, or individuals. The problems are more 
acute in the low-value cash or seller-financed transaction 
category with conveyance amounts of less than $10,000 
(figures 2a, 3a, and 4a).
While we have no direct evidence of harmful activity, 
owners of tax-delinquent properties are not likely to have 
the incentive to maintain them because they can be taken 
away in a tax foreclosure. The result can be devastating to 
neighborhoods.
Potential Remedies
Some have suggested that one way to address the harmful-
transaction problem would be to create a list of known  
repeat offenders and prevent them from acquiring property.  
A law of this type exists in Pennsylvania, where munici-
palities may petition to prevent a foreclosure auction 
purchaser from acquiring a property if that purchaser 
has been convicted of a housing code violation and has 
not corrected it.1 But using blacklists to prevent property 
acquisition may not be effective in a world where anyone 
placed on such a list could incorporate a new entity to 
continue acquiring property, which can be done quickly 
and inexpensively. In that sense, blacklists may be  
under-inclusive.
A more promising policy solution would require a change 
in state law: preventing county recorders, who are charged 
with tracking owners of real estate, from recording any new  
ownership of property that has outstanding delinquent 
taxes or code violation penalties. Currently, the Ohio  
Revised Code requires recorders to record authentic instru-
ments properly presented.2  Changing the law to prevent 
tax avoiders from closing on a transaction would directly 
address the problem by undermining the business model 
undergirding undesirable transactions. Unless purchasers  
paid taxes, improved the property, or kept up to code, they  
would be unable to legally transfer ownership. 
This solution would give every purchaser an incentive  
to maintain properties and keep them on the active tax 
rolls, or they would be unable to turn over inventory. 
Such a transfer restriction would discourage buyers from 
purchasing property for which they could not provide  
upkeep. It might also prevent corporate shell games, where 
a corporate entity sells a property to another corporate 
entity controlled by the same owner or owners in order to 
delay delinquent tax or housing code enforcement actions. 
A few words of caution: Because well-meaning purchasers 
can fall behind on taxes, broad transfer restrictions may be 
overly inclusive. Policymakers should carefully craft such 
restrictions to minimize unintended consequences. In 
the presence of such a restriction, for example, depository 
institutions may be reluctant to foreclose on a property if 
the property owner failed to pay taxes and they were not 
paid by the lender. Transfer restrictions may also chill the 
acquisition of properties with large amounts of outstanding 
taxes or code violations, even when potential purchasers  
would seek to rehabilitate the property or otherwise 
ensure its productive use.
These unintended consequences can be mitigated to some  
extent. For example, policymakers may want to allow 
properties to be transferred to public entities or land banks,  
to facilitate voluntary surrender of property despite back 
taxes and code violations. This type of exception may 
involve a county’s forgiving some or all back taxes when 
responsible buyers purchase property or allowing owner-
ship transfers if the new owner agrees to pay taxes or code 
violations over time. Additionally, it may make sense to 
allow involuntary property transfers related to a death, 
bankruptcy, foreclosure, or divorce, despite back taxes or 
code violations. These exceptions to transfer restrictions 
 1.  See 53 Pennsylvania Statutes § 7328(b.2) & 72 Pennsylvania Statues  
§ 5860.619(c) (2010), enacted in 1998.  Missouri attempted to create a similar 
provision that prohibits persons from bidding on property at sheriff’s sales, 
VAMS § 141.550.2(2) (1998), but the entire bill containing the law was struck 
down because the title of the bill was vague, violating Missouri’s constitutional 
requirement that bills have clear titles. See Home Builder Association v. State,  
75 S.W.3d 267 (Sup. Ct. Mo., 2002). 2.   Ohio Revised Code §§ 317.13 & 317.22 (2010).
A more promising policy solution would require a change in 
state law: preventing county recorders, who are charged with 
tracking owners of real estate, from recording any new owner-
ship of property that has outstanding delinquent taxes or code 
violation penalties.
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should be carefully crafted. Broad exceptions may allow 
undesirable transactions to continue, while narrow excep-
tions may inhibit healthy transactions.
Even with these exceptions, there could be a short-run 
slowdown in transfer activity as the market adjusts to the  
new rules. While some homeowners in the affected areas 
may see this as a negative outcome, we believe there are 
positive long-run consequences for all weak markets. 
Properties will be channeled to the land bank or to private 
rehabbers at lower cost in the absence of irresponsible 
buyers. This frees up resources for rehabilitation or demo-
lition. A smaller and more pristine housing inventory 
should stabilize home prices and strengthen the market  
in the long run.
Another possible unintended consequence of this pro-
posal is that in the short run, the restriction would slow 
the transfer of all property because of the time it takes to 
check for back taxes and assessments. This delay could 
be significant if records on real property taxes and other 
public assessments are not kept in an easily accessible 
electronic format. 
According to an informal survey we conducted with 
county recorders, at least four of Ohio’s 88 counties do  
not yet keep electronic tax records. Code violation records 
are kept at the municipal level, and it is unclear how many 
are kept electronically. To avoid slowing the transfer of real 
property, the state legislature may choose to allow counties  
to opt in or out of restrictions on transfer. In any case, law-
makers would need to work closely with lenders, real estate 
buyers and sellers, community development practitioners, 
and county governments to create exceptions and minimize 
unintended consequences while limiting harmful transfers.
Final Thoughts
Stories about irresponsible property speculators abound. 
Their very business model allows them to pay more than 
bidders who are interested in rehabilitation. Our analysis 
shows that large investors focus on tax-delinquent proper-
ties and often fail to pay property taxes. As a result, entire 
communities sometimes are unable to break the cycle of 
disinvestment and decline of their housing stock. 
  Requiring all past-due 
  taxes and code enforcement  
  penalties to be cleared  
  before transfer could help  
  many neighbor hoods in  
  their battle against vacancy,  
abandonment, and blight. It is one of many ways policy-
makers could discourage the transactions that hinder the 
rehabi lita tion of housing stock. At a time when govern-
ment budgets are stretched thin because of declining  
tax revenues, this policy proposal may give a jolt to the  
collection of property taxes. Cuyahoga County, for 
example, could have collected approximately $8.5 million 
in past-due taxes in 2009 under this proposal, notwith-
standing the likely decline in the number of property 
transfers one would expect as high-volume investors left 
the market. This tax revenue could be used to acquire and 
rehabilitate or demolish additional distressed properties.
Still, the availability of such untapped resources to all  
Ohio counties and municipalities may create an incentive 
for private investors to fund efforts to improve electronic 
record-keeping of taxes and code enforcement programs. 
In other words, the public entities could fund their efforts  
through bond issues that would be repaid with the  
enhanced property tax receipts. While this latter point is 
not necessarily a policy recommendation, it shows that 
this proposal may have advantages that go beyond the 
prevention of harmful transactions. The overall benefits 
certainly seem to outweigh the costs.  ■
What do you think?
We’re interested in hearing your comments as we refine this proposal. 
Send comments to forefront@clev.frb.org 
    25 refront FCharles W. Calomiris is not one to keep his thoughts to  
himself. His 55-page curriculum vitae lists dozens of academic 
articles with titles like “Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, 
and Credit Rationing”—and just as many op-eds in popular 
periodicals, like the Wall Street Journal piece, “Blame Fannie  
Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess.” It is not unusual for 
him to begin scratching out an editorial response to new  
legislation moments after he first hears about it in the news.  
A more outspoken and influential U.S. banking scholar you are 
not likely to find.
Interview with  
Charles Calomiris
CHRIS PAPPAS
Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial  
Institutions at the Columbia University Graduate School of 
Business and a professor at Columbia’s School of International  
and Public Affairs. Among his many other affiliations, he is  
a member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 
the Shadow Open Market Committee, and the Financial 
Economists Round table, and is a research associate of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. He has worked as an 
economist for the Federal Reserve and consulted for central 
banks around the globe.
Calomiris visited the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland last fall 
to participate in the Conference on Countercyclical Capital  
Requirements. Joseph Haubrich, vice president and economist  
with the Bank, interviewed Calomiris on October 14, 2010.  
An edited transcript follows.
 26  Winter 2011Haubrich: Let’s start out with a broad 
question. How would you rate the  
U.S. response to the financial crisis?
Calomiris: It’s a great question.  
I would start by distinguishing  
between long-term response and 
short-term response. I’d say that the 
biggest short-term failure was not  
to require recapitalization of the 
investment banks between March  
and September of 2008. I would have 
liked to have seen recapitalization 
happen during calm markets when  
it was obviously necessary. 
Also, with respect to the immediate 
response to the crisis, I would have 
designed TARP [the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, signed into law in  
October 2008] differently. I don’t 
think TARP was well-structured. 
Congress got to write the form of 
capital assistance for banks as a foot-
note to TARP, and it was structured 
to make a profit on the transactions 
rather than to encourage the right 
kind of stabilization assis tance. 
In many ways, our response in the 
1930s was better. I think there were 
lessons from history that we could 
have put to use in this crisis. And we 
suffered a lot, unnecessarily, with a  
liquidity crisis that wouldn’t have been 
so deep if we had used better ideas 
back in September and October 2008 
about how we were going to support 
the financial system. 
The Fed’s short-term actions were 
mostly appropriate—making liquidity  
available to the markets in various 
forms, particularly TALF [Term Asset- 
Backed Securities Loan Facility].  
I think this was a successful and  
warranted program. It conforms to 
what I take to be the central message 
of a what a lender of last resort has  
to do, which is try to take some risk  
on its balance sheet during a crisis,  
but to do so in as senior a way as 
possible. I’m not saying the Fed got 
everything right. 
I think that the Dodd–Frank bill,1  
which is the main form of long-term 
response to the crisis, suffers from 
both sins of commission (bad ideas 
enacted in haste) and sins of omission 
(it doesn’t really deal with some of the 
key problems that underlay the crisis). 
The key problems that we should  
have learned about from a prudential 
regulatory standpoint were, number 
one, the subsidization of risk in housing  
through high leverage, effectively 
financed by the government, either 
explicitly or implicitly. We need to  
address that. Second is the failure to 
accurately measure risk in the financial  
system on a forward-looking basis and 
to require capital accordingly. Going 
forward, we really need to address 
that problem, too. And third is the 
too-big-to-fail problem. I don’t think 
Dodd–Frank adequately tackled that 
problem. 
Haubrich: Part of the Dodd–Frank bill 
was setting up a variety of institutions, 
such as FSOC [Financial Stability Over-
sight Council], which are presumably  
going to provide stricter regulation for 
the systemically important or too-big-
to-fail institutions. Do you think that 
will be an adequate response?
Calomiris: My view is that we should 
have an incentive scorecard for any 
regulatory idea that asks how it is  
going to affect the incentives of people 
in the marketplace directly. And how 
is it going to affect the incentives of 
regulators, supervisors, and politicians  
to live by the rules they write? The 
creation of a new bureaucracy is not 
really getting at that in any direct way. 
Maybe it will help, maybe it will hurt. 
But it doesn’t really get at the key 
problems. 
I prefer other ideas that are under study  
and make a lot of sense. Contin gent 
capital certificates and the restructur-
ing of capital requirements are very 
promising. There are several people 
in the Federal Reserve System who 
are interested in that. If the oversight 
council is going to be a way to get 
good ideas like that formulated, then 
in conjunction with those new ideas 
it could be effective. So, it’s not a bad 
idea that we’re going to have more 
of a focal point on responsibility for 
coming up with good ideas in some 
coordinated way. Maybe it will help, 
maybe it won’t. But the ultimate test 
is going to be whether we see real 
mechanisms that matter for incentives 
coming out of those deliberations. 
Haubrich: You mentioned one aspect 
that hasn’t been dealt with: the  
incentive for leverage in the housing 
market. What would you do about the 
government-sponsored enterprises  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
Calomiris: I think that they should be 
phased out. I think that all government  
assistance to housing that’s taking the 
form of lending programs that try to 
subsidize affordable housing through 
making lending easier, and especially 
through very high leverage and very 
low interest rates, are the wrong way 
to subsidize housing, for two reasons: 
First, it encourages systemic risk, just  
like what we’ve experienced. A little 
bit of a decline in housing prices causes  
huge distress throughout the financial 
system, precisely because of leverage. 
Also, leverage encourages the wrong 
kind of risk that comes to the market 
because borrowers are not placing 
enough of their own resources at risk; 
people who are bad risks are willing to 
come to the mortgage market. So you 
get a bad incentive consequence in  
advance. Leverage also matters after 
the fact, by magnifying the losses in the 
financial system created by recession 
shocks or asset price declines. 
If there is a bona fide reason to promote 
affordable housing, it’s to create stake-
holders in local communities. But you’re 
not a stakeholder if you have a 3 percent 
down payment on your home—you are 
a renter in disguise.
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If leverage is not the way to promote 
affordable housing, then that means  
it is high time to phase out FHA  
[the Federal Housing Administration],  
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. 
Not only is mortgage risk subsidiza-
tion through high leverage risky, it 
also fails to achieve its goal. If there 
is a bona fide reason to promote 
affordable housing, it’s to create stake-
holders in local communities. But 
you’re not a stakeholder if you have 
a 3 percent down payment on your 
home—you are a renter in disguise. 
These extremely low down payments 
are a very recent trend, really the last 
two decades. It was all part of the  
desire to create invisibly—from a fiscal 
standpoint, that is, without showing  
the costs on the government’s balance  
sheet—these government supports, 
through high leverage and subsidized 
interest rates. But this approach doesn’t  
accomplish the housing objective, and  
it destabilizes the mortgage market 
and creates large costs to taxpayers.
Haubrich: OK, so what specifically 
would you do to ensure that home-
buyers are stakeholders in their  
communities?
Calomiris: I propose a four-part plan: 
Alongside phasing out Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and FHA as lending 
agencies, my proposal is to create a 
down payment assistance program 
modeled after the Australian program 
but on a means-tested basis. Every 
Australian qualifies for a $7,000 first- 
time homebuyer subsidy. This subsidy  
increases their down payment, reduces  
their leverage, and makes their home 
more affordable. It has a stabilizing 
effect on leverage ratios and creates 
a real stake for people in their homes 
and communities. 
A second part of that plan is to phase 
in, over a 17-year period, movement  
from the minimum 3 percent down 
payment requirement to a 20 percent 
minimum. A third policy that might 
also make sense, again on a means-
tested basis, is to provide some assis-
tance for the cost of locking in longer-
term interest rates for low-income 
people because they’re potentially 
more susceptible to the debt-service 
fluctuation cost. 
Finally, a fourth part of that plan might 
be to create home savings accounts 
that provide tax incentives for people 
to accumulate equity toward the down  
payment, again on a means-tested 
basis. As part of that, it would be 
interesting to think about also using 
some tax savings from payroll taxes, 
because most low-income people 
don’t pay income taxes; they pay only 
payroll taxes. 
All of these proposed costs would be 
budgeted explicitly. Let’s have trans-
parency so we show the government 
expenditure effects of these programs. 
Let’s create systemic stability, not  
instability. Let’s create homeowners, 
not renters in disguise. To me this 
would be a very rational approach to 
housing finance reform. We will need 
the political will to move away from 
the drug of leverage, which was attrac-
tive to the politicians in the first place 
because it disguised the government’s 
costs. Well, it’s a little hard to disguise 
them now that the costs of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac’s losses are likely to 
top $300 billion. Maybe that means 
we’ll get the political will to be a little 
more honest.
We will need the political will to  
move away from the drug of leverage, 
which was attractive to politicians in 
the first place because it disguised the 
government’s costs.  
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talk a little bit about the subject of the 
conference we’re hosting. Can counter-
cyclical capital regulation work?
Calomiris: I think it can. First let me  
define it. We know that capital require-
ments can constrain bank lending 
under some circumstances. It’s not 
just government capital require ments 
but also market capital requirements. 
Remember, government capital  
require ments are only about 30 years 
old in the United States, and we were 
the first country that I’m aware of that 
passed them.
Capital requirements mean requiring 
a certain ratio of your assets to be in 
the form of equity capital. It’s a fairly 
young idea. Before the government 
required it, the market required it. 
Now both the government and the 
market require it. The one that’s the 
binding constraint—the one that 
has the effect in determining capital 
requirements—is whichever is the 
higher of the two. 
People are worried about two  
problems. First, during recessions, 
banks may lose capital as a result of 
loan losses. For example, during a 
recession, to preserve their capital- 
to-asset ratio, they may have to cut 
their risky assets, meaning their loans. 
The other thing people worry about  
is that going into booms, that constant 
capital ratio maybe isn’t high enough 
to discourage excessive lending. 
These are the two arguments people 
make for dynamic capital require-
ments; that is, maybe we want  
capital requirements to be higher  
during booms as a way to discourage  
excessive lending. And maybe we 
want capital requirements to fall  
during recessions as a way to avoid 
really severe credit crunches. I think 
there is at least some evidence for  
the tendency for excessive lending 
in some booms. I don’t think it’s a 
general problem, but it does happen 
occasionally. 
The key question is whether we can 
measure it. Can we measure when 
lending markets are excessive and 
when lending markets are going 
through recessions? We’d like to vary 
capital requirements—to relax them 
during recessions and to increase 
them during booms, especially booms 
where we’re very worried about exces-
sive lending. Is this something that 
can be measured? I would say yes. It 
can’t be measured perfectly but it can 
be measured fairly well. 
A paper by Claudio Borio and Mathias 
Drehmann at the BIS [Bank for  
Inter national Settlements] showed 
that very severe recessions tend to 
happen when lending growth is very 
high just prior to the recession, during  
the boom, and when asset prices are  
growing very fast. So one could impose  
higher capital requirements based on 
a dual threshold. When loan growth 
gets very high and asset prices are 
growing very quickly, you’d like to  
impose higher capital requirements, 
and doing so will help you achieve a  
better soft landing, cooling down the  
loan growth and helping  the economy. 
Haubrich: Now capital requirements are 
changing. Basel III 2 is coming up with a 
set of recommendations. Could you give 
us your take on those proposals?
Calomiris: They’re talking about  
phasing in an increase in capital 
requirements for Tier 1 capital. It’s 
a maximum leverage requirement 
rather than just a risk-based capital 
requirement. These are good ideas. 
But are they enough? No.
A little increase in capital doesn’t solve  
the problem. The key problem was the 
failure to measure risk on an ongoing, 
forward-looking basis, fairly accurately,  
and to require capital accordingly. If 
you just bump up capital a little bit, 
what’s to prevent risk from going up 
even more? If financial institutions 
want to create risk and want to hide  
it from their regulators, under the  
existing Basel system it’s almost 
trivial to do it. The Basel system still, 
unbeliev ably, says that the way we 
measure risk is asking banks what 
the risk is and asking ratings agencies 
what the risk is. That is not dealing 
with the incentive problems that got 
us into the mis-measurement of risk 
in the first place, so we have to think 
more creatively about mechanisms 
that can solve this problem. 
One paper that was published in  
2003 by Don Morgan and Adam 
Ashcraft in the Journal of Financial 
Services Research shows that interest-  
rate spreads on loans are very good 
predictors of loan default risk. In the  
common parlance we would say, 
“Duh!” Because after all, that’s the 
point of spreads. They’re supposed  
to compensate banks for risk. 
The authors showed in 2003 that we 
could’ve used interest rate spreads  
as good forward-looking measures  
of risk. We didn’t use them! If we  
had used them in the subprime crisis, 
we would’ve budgeted a lot more 
capital against subprime risks and 
we would’ve been better off. So ideas 
coming out of Basel to tweak capital 
requirements in a way that’s not 
related to measuring risk are doomed 
to fail. 
What we need to do is take risk mea-
surement seriously in a way that deals 
also with incentive problems. Notice 
that my proposal to gear default risk 
measures to loan spreads is incentive-
robust. Why? Because no bank is  
going to cut its interest rate to save a 
little bit on its capital requirements. 
That means that interest rates will  
provide robust measures of risk, and 
we can therefore reliably use those 
interest-rate spreads to measure risk.
The Basel system still, unbelievably, 
says that the way we measure risk is 
asking banks what the risk is and asking 
ratings agencies what the risk is. 
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 2.   The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been meeting since 1974 to improve and coordinate 
the quality of bank supervision worldwide. The most recent effort to strengthen capital requirements was 
dubbed Basel III.That’s just one of several ideas that 
illustrate the idea of incentive-robust 
regulatory reforms. These reforms 
would sometimes force banks to 
maintain more capital—but capital 
commensurate with risk—using  
measures of risk that we could rely on. 
Haubrich: Some people argue that high-
enough capital requirements would 
reduce the incentive that banks have 
for taking risk. It sounds like you don’t 
agree with that?
Calomiris: The problem is that finan-
cial firms are designed to be able to 
arbitrarily increase risk. Financial 
contracts can reshape and re-cut risk 
in many different ways to create a little  
risk or a lot of risk, depending on what  
they want to achieve. You can’t say that  
a loan has X amount of risk, because 
banks can construct loans that might 
appear very similar that have very  
different kinds of risk. We have to have  
a flexible means of measuring risk. 
If we just say we’re going to increase 
capital a little bit, banks could very 
easily just make sure that the com-
position of risks of the loans in their 
portfolio are commensurately higher, 
therefore achieving nothing in terms 
of stabilizing a system. That’s the story 
of what is sometimes called regulatory 
arbitrage, that is, the private sector 
undoing the effect of any regulation.  
If the regulations are dumb, the private 
sector will always smartly undo them.  
The regulations have to be smart enough  
so that they’re robust to incentives. 
Haubrich: To follow up on that, to what 
extent do you think the problem behind 
the crisis was, say, regulatory arbitrage, 
and to what extent was it deregula tion?
Calomiris: I’ll start with the second 
part of the question. Deregulation 
had nothing to do, in my view, with 
the crisis. The main deregulation that 
happened in the United States in the 
1980s and the 1990s really dealt with 
two important issues. One of them was  
whether banks should be allowed to 
branch throughout the United States. 
In 1994, national deregulation of 
branching was a culmination of state 
and regional deregulation of branching  
that was occurring throughout the ’80s  
and early ’90s. That was a stabilizing 
policy. It has been shown time and 
time again for a whole host of reasons 
to be a very good idea as a matter of 
economic policy. 
The other main deregulation was 
for banks and investment banks. It 
allowed banks to engage in the under-
writing of corporate securities, which 
they previously had been limited in 
doing. This crisis had nothing to do 
with the underwriting of corporate 
securities. 
Furthermore, subprime mortgage 
activities, which were important in 
creating the crisis, were something 
banks could have engaged in prior 
to the two deregulations I’ve talked 
about, and in fact did. Deregulation 
allowed commercial banks to engage 
in traditional investment-banking and 
corporate-underwriting practices, and 
allowed commercial banks to branch. 
These were stabil izing, in fact, during 
the crisis.
Why? Because of greater diversifica-
tion of income. Furthermore, remem-
ber, the way we dealt with this crisis 
was by allowing investment banks to 
be purchased by commercial banks. 
That was possible because of deregu-
lation, and it helped to stabilize the 
system in reaction to the crisis. 
When you hear the political rhetoric 
about deregulation, I think what  
people really mean is that we had a 
failed prudential regulatory system. 
Banks and investment banks were both 
under prudential regulation under 
the Basel standards. The investment 
banks were being regulated, under 
Basel, by the SEC [Securities and 
Exchange Commission]. And what 
we can say is that it wasn’t a very 
good regulatory system. We did not 
maintain capital commen surate with 
risk very effectively. But starting in 
2002, the investment banks were all 
regulated, long before this crisis hit.  
If anything, prudential regulation was 
increasing over time during the phase 
when the crisis took hold.
What we really have to ask is what 
was missing in regulation. What was 
missing was what we’ve been talking 
about: accurate measurement of risk 
on a forward-looking basis. The other  
problem that arose between March 
2008 and September 2008 was that 
once we bailed out Bear Stearns,  
others expected bailouts instead 
of recapitalizing as they needed to. 
They didn’t want to recapitalize in 
a way that would dilute their stock 
values. Why not take a bet, hope that 
if things go badly they’ll get bailed 
out? If things go well, they won’t have 
to dilute by issuing new equity. That 
too-big-to-fail problem needs to be 
addressed, too. We’ve done little to  
address those two basic problems.
What we really have to ask is what was 
missing in regulation. What was missing  
was what we’ve been talking about: 
accurate measurement of risk on a 
forward-looking basis.
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Haubrich: We haven’t talked much 
about monetary policy. Do you think 
monetary policy contributed in a  
material way to the financial crisis? 3
Calomiris: Yes. From 2002 to 2005,  
the real federal funds rate was negative.
And the only other four-year period  
in postwar history where that was 
true was 1975 through 1978, the high- 
inflation period. If you looked at it 
from the standpoint of the Taylor rule  
as a function of the unemployment 
rate and the inflation rate, the Fed 
stopped following the Taylor rule  
during the period 2002 to 2005.4 
The Fed kept the fed funds rate about 
2 percentage points on average below 
what that rule would have implied. So 
the Fed surprised the market from the 
stand point of the Taylor rule, ran very 
loose monetary policy with a negative 
real fed funds rate, and there is pretty 
convincing statistical evidence that 
this contributed to the underpricing 
of risk leading up to the crisis.
That said, I can tell you from a histor-
ical perspective that monetary policy 
mistakes like that—and I regard it as a  
mistake—do not cause these kinds of  
crises. They cause asset-price problems,  
but to get into a banking crisis you need  
the large losses relative to bank capital, 
and you can’t blame that on monetary 
policy. Contrast, for example, with  
the dot-com boom and bust, where 
the actual losses were greater than the 
subprime boom and bust. Yet it didn’t 
have any effect on the whole financial 
system. Why? Because it wasn’t a 
leveraged loss. Housing leverage and 
banking leverage in the recent crisis 
translated into an overpricing of some 
assets and into the demise of the 
financial system. 
Yes, the Fed contributed to the over-
pricing of real estate assets and other 
assets, but that doesn’t translate into 
a financial crisis. You need the other 
distortions on the microeconomic 
side, particularly the housing finance 
distortions, to really understand the 
depth of the crisis.
Haubrich: Thank you very much.  ■
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 3.  For Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s take on this question,  
see www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm.
 4.   The Taylor rule is the monetary policy rule for targeting the federal funds rate that 
many believe the Fed seemed to be following prior to 2002.In All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the  
Financial Crisis (Penguin 2010), authors Bethany McLean 
and Joe Nocera prove that there is still more to learn about  
the recent financial crisis. McLean, a contributing editor 
at Vanity Fair, who was among the first reporters to break 
the Enron story, and Nocera, a business columnist for the 
New York Times, draw their title from Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest. The implication, regrettably appropriate in both 
the 1600s and the 2000s, is that that plenty of hell can be 
found among the living right here on earth. 
McLean and Nocera provide an outstanding, high-level 
overview of the course of the recent financial crisis, 
including its often-overlooked roots in the decades from 
1930 to 2000, but they focus most intensely on the years 
since 2000. Each chapter of the book could work as a 
stand-alone piece; indeed, some of them first appeared as 
magazine and newspaper articles. The book is heavier on 
anecdotes about personalities, institutions, government 
policies, and events than on in-depth analysis of the crisis. 
It should appeal both to novices and to experts who could 
use some help in putting their other readings in context.
All the Devils Are Here:  
The Hidden History  
of the Financial Crisis
by Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera  
Penguin 2010
Reviewed by  
Dan Littman,  
Economist 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Book Review
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The first is the interconnection of personal, institutional, 
and public policy flaws that brought on the crisis. In that 
sense, all the devils really were here.
The authors do not find personifications of evil. What they  
find are plenty of flawed individuals in positions of power. 
Some of them are at once pathetic and sympathetic, like 
Stan O’Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, whose isolation  
from events at the nation’s largest retail brokerage company  
is exemplified by his practice of playing 18 holes of golf  
by himself, several times a week (though it could be noted,  
in O’Neal’s defense, that J.P. Morgan famously played 
solitaire for hours in his office to unwind).
McLean and Nocera also find flawed institutions, or 
rather, flawed mechanisms of communication within 
institutions. At AIG, for example, only the CEO was  
informed about important developments in the company’s  
far-flung divisions; senior leaders were deliberately kept  
in the dark. This prevented wiser heads from closing down 
the London unit that traded in credit default swaps, which 
should have been shuttered months or years earlier. The 
authors identify flawed public policy as well, with the 
federal government’s multi-pronged, pro-housing policies 
a particularly ripe target for criticism.
A second recurrent theme is the difficulty of being a lone 
voice of reason, leaning against the wind, in institutions 
making huge profits. The authors report that in companies  
like AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, 
Citibank, and others, some senior officials recognized that 
something was rotten in the business of mortgage securi-
tization and credit default swaps, but found that they were 
crying in the wilderness. McLean and Nocera recount 
that when these employees questioned the business model,  
they were sidelined to unimportant jobs or fired. The 
most memorable of them was the chief risk officer at 
Merrill Lynch who, despite being a longtime associate of 
the company CEO, was pulled off the trading floor where 
he could observe daily activities. He left the company, 
returned at the urging of former colleagues, and found 
himself pulled off the trading floor a second time.
A third key theme is the degree to which market partici-
pants relied more on the perceived wisdom of crowds and 
the emotions of the market than on their understanding of  
market fundamentals. Investment professionals throughout 
the industry, including many who had doubts (however 
ill-formed) about the underlying mortgage origination 
and securitization business model, were more prone to 
follow the initially profitable herd. 
Many in the industry recognized that a lot of borrowers  
and properties were unworthy of loans, or that junk 
tranches in mortgage bonds repackaged as synthetic 
collateralized debt obliga tions with AAA ratings were 
illogical. But as long as investment banks were willing 
to buy and package the mortgages, and as long as those 
banks could find willing customers for the bonds, they 
continued to do so. One sad episode of this story involves 
Angelo Mozilo, chairman and CEO of Countrywide, who 
initially resisted entry into the subprime mortgage and 
refinancing market, but then relented in order to protect 
the company’s standing as the largest housing lender in 
the United States. Countrywide soon became one of the 
most spectacular crash stories of the financial crisis.
Ultimately, the authors paint a troubling portrait of a world  
afflicted with human and institutional flaws. In ordinary 
times, we accept such flaws as part of the human landscape.  
In crisis times, though, such flaws are fuel to the fire of  
systemic risk. This is a world in which those who lean against  
the wind are dismissed by their bosses and colleagues, and 
the emotions of the investment crowd matter more than 
business fundamentals. It is also a world that will resist 
most efforts to avoid these kinds of crises in the future. 
Public policies, whether well or sloppily crafted, still have 
to address the harmful but inescapable elements of human  
nature. As Ariel put it in The Tempest, “Hell is empty and 
all the devils are here.”  ■
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